This article establishes a definition of we-narrative based on a plural type of narrator, and in doing so challenges many of the presuppositions in the recent work on we-narratives. Despite an increased interest in this mode of narration, a definition of specifically first-person plural narrative as an independent narrative form has not yet been suggested and we-narrators have been mostly measured by the I-narrator's yardstick. I propose instead to consider we-narrators as an independent type of a collective character narrator that distinguishes we-narratives as such from we-discourses in otherwise first-person narratives. To demonstrate that we-narrative exists as an independent narrative form, I will combine an analysis of three case studies-short stories by William Faulkner and Joyce Carol Oates as well as a novel by Joshua Ferris-with a discussion of existing contributions to the topic. I will rely on earlier work by Susan Lanser, Uri Margolin, and Franz Karl Stanzel and draw on contributions by Monika Fludernik, Brian Richardson, and Amit Marcus. A formal definition of we-narrative is required, I argue, to productively analyze the features and rhetorical effects specific to we-narrative in terms of its own conventions of narration and without linking these to the classical form of first-person narrative.
gue, constitutes one of the sites of expression of human collectives and, in particular, a place where collective subjectivities can be imagined, constructed, and endowed with a collective voice. Strikingly, however, narratological models have been resistant to an incorporation or even recognition of plural, collective characters and narrators in fiction. With this article I aim to direct attention to such collective narrative instances. My argument here is threefold: (1) there exist a recognizably distinct type of first-person plural narration rooted in collective subjectivity-a we-voice; (2) it is different from we-references in other types of narrative situations and cannot be described as an implicit 'I' plus 'somebody '; and (3) it cannot be reduced to or fully described as 'unnatural' narration.
In other words, I am arguing for a recognition of a new narrative situation, we-narrative, which, similarly to the three forms singled out by Stanzel (1984) , affords realistic, 'natural, ' experimental ('unnatural') , and other types of scenarios. Throughout this article two terms, 'we-narration' and 'we-narrative, ' are used not as synonyms but in the primary sense of 'narration' vs. 'narrative, ' generally understood as 'process' vs. 'product' . Thus, the distinction is between a type of narrative discourse and a type of narrative form. Although it may seem obvious, I focus on this distinction here because of a certain confusion, endemic to recent theoretical texts and bibliographies devoted to we-narratives (e.g., Fludernik "The Category of 'Person' "), as to what exactly constitutes the object of investigation. Passages of we-narration can be found in texts composed in other narrative situations. Employed for various reasons, these passages, however, do not require that the narrative in which they are used be classified as a we-narrative with all the analytical and interpretative consequences such classification would entail.
We-narrative can then be defined as a narrative situation with a dominant category of person where 'person' refers to a group who narrates and who is also a character, consistently using the first-person plural pronoun for self-designation and self-reference. In other words, narration by collective subjectivity is the dominant mode of we-narrative. In terms of knowledge, feelings, and focalization scope, we-narrator creates a holistic supraindividual level that supercedes a mere aggregation of individual characters and thus cannot be identified with or reduced to an 'I' speaking on behalf of such a group. Thus, in some cases, it can be said to represent what Alan Palmer (2010, 39) has identified as a "social mind. "
2 Such a we-narrator can function either as a witness or protagonist and varies in scope from families, groups of colleagues, or suburban communities to revolutionary collectives, whole towns, or nations.
To nuance this concise definition, in what follows I will briefly compare examples of a typical first-person narrative with unproblematic we-reference (William Faulkner's short story "That Will Be Fine"), of a first-person narrative with thematically significant passages of we-narration (Joyce Carol Oates's short story "Parricide"), and of a we-narrative as an independent narrative form (Joshua Ferris's novel Then We Came to the End). I will then situate my argument within the existing work on the topic and offer a more extensive discussion of Then We Came to the End. This will become the basis of an extended definition of we-narrative in the final section of the article.
Brief Taxonomy of We-Uses: First-Person Narratives,
We-Narratives, and Significant Shifts
Generally, we-references by the narrator can be found in three contexts: (1) in first-person narratives where individual character narration dominates and 'we' is used fairly straightforwardly to refer to the I-narrator plus somebody else; (2) in multiperson narratives in which the narration fluctuates between individual and plural references in thematically significant ways; and (3) in narratives in which collective subjectivity defines the dominant mode of narration. I suggest theorizing only the third case as we-narrative. Faulkner's short story "That Will Be Fine" (1935) , which is sometimes cited as a we-narrative, is a good example of the first case. It is a fairly straightforward first-person narrative that uses we-discourse in an indicative manner. 4 The story opens with the following paragraph: "We could hear the water running into the tub. We looked at the presents scattered over the bed where mamma had wrapped them in the colored paper, with our names on them so Grandpa could tell who they belonged to easy when he would take them off the tree" (265). This paragraph is immediately followed by the direct speech: " 'This one is yours, ' I said. 'Sho now!' Rosie said. 'You come and get in that tub like your mamma tell you' " (265). It identifies the I-speaker (a child) and his nanny Rosie, making it clear that the 'we' in the opening paragraph is an indicative situational reference: the I-narrator referring to himself and another person present in the room. The story develops as a typical first-person narrative: a boy is telling a story which revolves around his family and thus, unavoidably, includes numerous references to shared activities. Here is another example: "So I went and bathed and came back, with the presents all scattered out across mamma's and papa's bed. . . . It would be just tonight, and then tomorrow we would get on the train . . . and go to Grandpa's, and then tomorrow night and then it would be Christmas and Grandpa would take the presents off the tree and call out our names" (266, emphasis added). Even though the 'I' of the narrator may be absent from extended stretches of this short story, this alone does not qualify such narrative as a we-narrative: I-narrators cannot but use we-references when their belonging to any group needs to be addressed.
Contrary to the unproblematic we-references of "That Will Be Fine, " my second example, Joyce Carol Oates's short story "Parricide, " brings out an inherent tension to the we-voice between its collective and individual aspects. Technically, "Parricide" (1975) also is a first-person narrative with extensive passages of narration in the plural but the shifts between 'I' and 'we' in this short story are thematically significant. It opens with three students entering the office of Dr. Gouveia who is interviewing a boy charged with the murder of his father. The opening is narrated in the present-tense plural with an external collective perspective and thus creates a feeling of simultaneity: as 'we' enter, 'we' discover the room, its setting, the way the boy looks and how the boy and Dr. Gouveia conduct themselves. Suddenly, this more or less uninvolved and collective gaze turns into a very personal and individual one:
The three of us, three young men, sit at the table self-consciously, and are displeased at its ugly, nicked surface and the fact that one of its legs is obviously shorter than the others. The table will wobble slightly if we lean on it. The boy glances at us shyly, his lips twitching as if he wanted to smile.
We do not smile at him. My heart begins to pound laboriously, as if I desired something I could not tame. (40) In contrast to the initial generalizing we-voice, the first line of this passage sounds a lot less general: it seems implausible that the three of 'us' are self-conscious and displeased at the table all at the same time. The sudden comment by the I-speaker that his heart begins to pound yields itself to an interpretation that he is the narrator whose feelings were described above (he is self-conscious, displeased, and is trying to avoid smiling) and who has been masking himself, for some reason, behind the communal voice.
This appearance of the singular voice, however, is immediately contained by the narrative as the following passage regains collective focalization and narration (but without losing the newly-gained emotional coloring). Consider a further passage that exemplifies the tension between the we-voice narrating the scene and the 'I' of one of the students implicitly focalizing it: "The boy is listening closely. His breath is not rhythmic, but self-conscious, as if he had to remember to breathe. Perhaps it is because of our presence, we three students who cannot help staring. We are neatly dressed, in dark suits and ties. Our hair is neatly combed, unlike the boy's. We are not so dark as he. We do not smile and blink so childishly as he, but our heartbeats quicken along with his" (41, emphasis added). Here the we-group, "we three students, " is stressed over and over again and 'our' presence permeates the scene. But because of the sudden appearance of the 'I' in the earlier description of the boy's hair, skin, and smile, this passage also has a strong individual tone Even though the narration is in the plural, there is a pronounced 'I' behind it and thus, in terms of the perspective that orients the passage, this we-voice cannot be plausibly imagined as an intersubjective, communal stance any more. At the same time, the we-voice in "Parricide" cannot be reduced to the indicative function alone because of the insistent returns to the collective narration and focalization that mask first-person singular. The shifts between 'I' and 'we' are thematically significant as they suggest hidden feelings, motives, and unreliability-by the end of the story, the character 'I' becomes implicated in pedophilic innuendos and murder.
There is a fundamental difference, then, between a first-person narrative with we-references, e.g., "That Will Be Fine, " and a first-person narrative with thematically significant passages of we-narration, like "Parricide, " where the interplay between these two distinct narrative voices produces striking thematic effects. The situation is yet again different with Ferris's novel Then We Came to the End (2007) where we-narration gains a defining structural significance and whose narrator cannot be reduced to an 'I. ' Being a representative example of what I propose calling "we-narrative, " this novel about white-collar workers is set in an office of an advertising agency permeated with the fear of layoffs. What is formally striking about this narrative is that its narrator is literally the whole office: the agency employees function as a plural character with a unified we-voice. They perform collective actions and express shared perspectives and emotions. They collectively muse over their lives and gossip about each other's affairs or who is the next in line to be fired. That the gossiping and physical actions, for example, are consistently collective becomes significant over the course of narrative because it makes it progressively more difficult to link we-references to some implied I-narrator:
Those of us who didn't go to lunch that day saw them [Marcia and Benny] talking by the elevators. That was most of us, because of the pressing demands of the new business. We wondered the same thing those of us who'd gone to lunch wondered. After Marcia slipped past Roland on her way outcoming off a full elevator, ingeniously disguised as one of us-we all went down to Benny's office and asked him what they had been talking about. He refused to say. "Never mind, " he said, dismissing us outright. . . . We asked him a second time and a third. We came back fifteen minutes later and asked the same question in a different way. We sent him e-mails. "Never mind, " he wrote back. Not wanting to rub it in, we let it drop. This passage is representative of we-narration in the rest of the novel. The we-reference constantly fluctuates between those members of the we-group who are present and absent, and between 'us' and 'them, ' the outsiders. The shifts, however, are not between 'we' and 'I, ' like in "Parricide. " Even with temporary absences, 'our' integrity is constantly reinforced by passages such as: "We wondered the same thing those of us who'd gone to lunch wondered. " And whereas the outsiders might occasionally join 'us, ' they still are only "disguised as one of us, " which contributes to the sense of a closed group. In the passage above, the collective narrator is united (and delimited) against Marcia and Benny and becomes thus objectified as a character, as a definite group with a strong sense of belonging. Collective actions, such as "we all went down to Benny's office, " "we came back fifteen minutes later, " or "we sent him e-mails, " add to this objectification. Consistent use of such we-reference, which does not reveal any I-speakers nor allow speculations about one, is a characteristic mark of we-narrative in the sense for which I am arguing here.
We-Narratives and We-Narration: The Distinction between Narrative Form and Narrative Discourse
Classical narratology has seldom studied 'we' narrators. As Genette remarks, "every narrative is, explicitly or not, 'in the first person' since at any moment its narrator may use that pronoun to designate himself " (97). Thus, any other narratorial references, like 'you' or 'we, ' should be treated as mere stand-ins for an extradiegetic singular narrator. Recently, however, there has been a steady increase in theoretical attention to we-narratives, partly fueled by the increasing popularity of research into intermental minds in fiction as well as growing interest in this form amongst writers themselves. Nevertheless, existing publications on we-narratives still are largely predicated on the classical conception of the narrator, with its implicit link to first-person narratives, and on an ostensive understanding of what constitutes a we-narrative.
Such an approach has led to a wide variety of texts being labelled as we-narratives. A good example is Fludernik's 2011 bibliography of literary we-narratives, composed of texts analyzed by Marcus, Margolin, Richardson, and herself, where Fludernik includes Faulkner's short-story "A Rose for Emily" (1930) , which is a paradigmatic example of a we-narrative, together with his "That Will Be Fine" (1935) , which is a first-person narrative (sensu Stanzel) where a narrator uses 'we' to refer to himself and his family, and Franz Kafka's "Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk" (1924) , where a singular narrator speaks on behalf of a community. At the same time, out of the two short stories by Joyce Carol Oates, "The Brain of Dr. Vicente" and "Parricide" (a we-narrative and a first-person narrative with extensive passages of we-narration, respectively), only the first is included in the bibliography. Similarly, the bibliography includes Jeffrey Eugenides's novel The Virgin Suicides (1993) and Michael Dorris's A Yellow Raft in Blue Water (1987) , the former being a we-narrative with a communal we-narrator, whereas the latter is a multiperson narrative composed of three sequential first-person narrators whose accounts contribute to a creation of a communal story. The reasons for this confusion, as I see it, are the (at least) three senses in which the term 'we-narrative' is currently being used as well as a tendency to designate with the term 'narrative' both we-discourses in a narrative and a narrative text as a whole. This section will try to iron out such issues.
The various senses of what is understood under a 'we-narrative' could have their roots in one of the first investigations of we-narration-Susan Lanser's typology of narrative voices in Fictions of Authority (1992) . Investigating the relationship between narrative form and the form-dependent construction of the authority of narrative voice, Lanser suggests a term "communal voice" (21) which can be produced in "a singular form in which one narrator speaks for a collective, a simultaneous form in which a plural 'we' narrates, and a sequential form in which individual members of a group narrate in turn" (ibid., emphasis in original). This covers all the examples that Fludernik lists as we-narratives. But as is clear from Lanser's definition, 'communal voice' is a qualifier much broader in scope than 'we-voice' and is not necessarily created with the help of the technique of we-narration. In other words, one has to distinguish between rhetorical effects and their means: we-narration is only one technique amongst many that can produce an effect of a communal story. After Lanser's ground-breaking study, Margolin, in one of the most extensive studies of the formal, stylistic, and thematic features of collective narrative, suggests the following definition:
A narrative is a collective narrative if a collective narrative agent occupies the protagonist role. The difference between standard and collective narratives resides therefore in the reversal of the usual proportion between individual and collective agents. Not every collection of individuals (e.g., Zola's crowds) qualifies as a collective agent. To qualify, the collection must act as a plural subject or we-group, capable of forming shared group intentions and acting on them jointly. ("Telling in the Plural" 591)
Acting as a we-group with shared intentions is the defining feature of the narrator in Then We Came to the End, as I have argued above. The major formal implication of this definition, however, is that a collective narrative agent can manifest itself in a number of ways: it can be a we-group or any other plural subject identified by a group-reference, such as 'us, ' 'them, ' "the people who came out of Egypt, " or "your [God's] children" ("Telling in the Plural" 613). Thus, if one equates we-narrative with collective narrative in Margolin's sense, then, again, such a grouping would include various narrative forms. For Margolin, we-narratives, because they often straddle individual and group levels, "consequently include passages in the 'I, ' 'you, ' or 'he or she' mode, and the narrator often refers to himself/herself as a distinct, identifiable 'I, ' not just the impersonal 'we' sayer of official pronouncements" ("Telling Our Story" 115). This description covers a lot of ground, including authorial and first-person narrative situations. Moreover, Margolin, like Genette, ultimately denies the plurality of the narrator: "There is always a single 'we' sayer on the highest level of textual embedding" (119).
While I am indebted to Lanser's and Margolin's analyses of communal and collective storytelling, my aim is to distinguish we-narrative as a separate narrative form. Thus, I suggest limiting we-narratives to those narratives that rely predominantly on the plural person of the narrator and exclude singular narrators (a simultaneous communal voice in Lanser's sense). As narrators, we-characters not only occupy the protagonist role but can function as witnesses, observers, and so on fulfilling the usual narrator functions. The effects of plural narration can be comparable to those of a collective narrative (sensu Margolin) but the combination of voices of 'we, ' 'I, ' and 'they' can also be more productively viewed under the dynamic of narrative situations which combine different narrative 'persons, ' e.g., as 'multiperson' narratives (cf. Richardson "I Etcetera"). Moreover, the narrator of a we-narrative is distinct from the we-voice of "official pronouncements, " be it the humbling academic 'we' or the majestic royal 'we' or the conventional author's 'we' that includes the reader. I argue, along with Richardson, that "it is most useful to see the 'we'-narrator as a different kind of figure from the realistic type of first person narrator"; pace Richardson, however, I do not consider the we-narrator as "a postmodern first person narrator who refuses to be bound by the epistemological rules of realism" ("Plural Focalization" 152). The we-narrator is a new first-person plural narrator, whose nature it is to possess collective epistemological, perspectival, and other qualities and thus create new rules of (collective) realism. I shall return to this point below.
Like Margolin, Fludernik in her contribution to the discussion is reliant on first-person narratives as a reference point for we-narratives. However, unlike Richardson, Fludernik treats we-narratives as mundane, rather than transgressive of realist conventions: "Unlike you narrative, which is highly odd-one usually does not tell one's interlocutor his or her story-we narratives, both inclusive (I + you) and exclusive (I + he/she/they), are quite common in real-life storytelling. Couples . . . soldiers, students, pupils, office colleagues and members of choirs, chess clubs, sports competitions, football teams and so on and so forth-all tell stories about their various shared experiences" ("The Category of 'Person' " 114; emphasis in original). 5 Applying this view also to fictional we-narratives (120-21), Fludernik does not consider the possibility of a non-I narrator, of a we-voice that is neither inclusive nor exclusive. By contrast, I suggest that a we-voice of we-narrative does not hinge upon the implicit 'I + somebody' equation but rather represents a collective subject. In this sense it differs from the 'we' in stories by couples or football fans. A fully realized we-narrator is not reducible to an 'I' since it is a community, a collective subject which, as J. M. Bernstein points out in a different context, is "a subjectivity that is not privative and exclusive, a 'we speak' that neither collapses into many exclusive subjectivities nor pretends to the elimination of all subjectivity from narrative" (257). This constitutes a crucial difference between the 'we' in full-blown we-narratives and the unproblematic, 'natural' cases to which Fludernik refers.
Furthermore, once we-narrative is recognized as a distinctive narrative situation, with a particular kind of plural narrator, then it becomes possible to distinguish between a variety of effects-realistic and 'unnatural' 6 -for which such a form can be employed. My argument is that we-narration can function within realistic conventions without disrupting them since it relies on expectations different from I-narration. That a town community in Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily, " for example, knows what happened behind the closed doors of one of its neighbors is not a transgression of narratorial epistemological limitations-since we are not talking about singular I-narrator-but a property of a community where knowledge circulates with the help of gossip. The issues that Richardson labels as "unnatural" ("Representing Social Minds" 207)-such as, for example, identity and knowledge claims of we-narratorsarguably do not come into question for the reader of this short story. Faulkner's 'we' is the town community and their knowledge is vast because of the numerous eyes and ears directed onto Emily's house. Susan Sontag's experimental short story "Baby" (1978), on the contrary, relies for its effects on the transforming strangeness of the narrating we-voice. The story takes the form of a transcript of recorded patient-doctor conversations. Starting with a seemingly unproblematic 'dual we' of a couple who is visiting a therapist, this story problematizes a clear-cut distinction between the two partners by performatively creating a truly plural narrating subject that eventually transcends the dual 'we. ' In doing so, "Baby" erases the divisions between individual consciousness, female and male, and mother and father, producing a unified image of parenthood overwhelmed by trauma.
Merging of individual subjectivities to create an intermental mind leads me to Palmer's theory of social minds in fiction and its applicability in the case of we-narratives. I am theorizing the phenomenon of plural narrators somewhat in parallel to Palmer's work and hence cannot engage here with his theory more extensively. Palmer (2010 Palmer ( , 2011 has identified the importance of social minds in fiction and, in particular, of intersubjectivity rooted in socially distributed, situated, or extended cognition. I would like to stress the importance of recognizing that social collectives of various scopes can function as narrators and characters. I agree with Palmer that a lot of the mental functioning in narratives is done by groups of various sizes. At the same time, I believe this is only one aspect of representation of collectivities and that the scholarly scope of neglect of large social units in fiction is much larger than issues of cognition. 7 Methodologically, Palmer draws on social psychology which "routinely use[s] the terms mind and mental action not only about individuals, but also about groups of people working as intermental units" ("The Mind Beyond the Skin" 83; emphasis in original) and goes on to conclude that it is appropriate to say of groups that they think. Similarly, to counter the claims that we-narrators are unnatural, I draw on sociological inquiries into collectives: fictional narratives often represent groups that are not unlike those in the 'real world' and claiming that such representations are unnatural relies on the assumption that humans can only function in the 'singular mode' (while recent philosophical and sociological research continues to prove the opposite). Finally, I would like to briefly consider Marcus's approach which explicitly addresses the distinction between we-narratives and passages of we-narration. Marcus uses the term to "refer not only to narratives told wholly or mostly in the first-person plural, but also to narratives in which there are thematically significant shifts from 'we' to other pronouns and vice versa" ("We Are You" 2). He avoids a more rigorous definition because of "the scarcity of such narratives" ("Dialogue and Authoritativeness" 135 ) and because "some of the most noteworthy ways of employing the first-person plural are best illustrated in texts that alternate between 'we' and other forms of narration" ("We Are You" 2). Describing we-narratives by comparison with narration in other persons, Marcus observes: "Like first-person singular narration, 'we' narration is based on personal experience and is thus limited to the scope of human knowledge (in contrast with omniscient narration). 'We' narratives lack the objectivity, reliability, and veracity conventionally attributed to third-person narration" (1-2). This approach is problematic in several respects. First, we-narration is very much unlike first-person singular narration in that it is based on the collective experience and agency of a collective body. It thereby transcends the individual subject in the scope of its knowledge, temporal, and spatial limitations. Second, however, not every instance of we-narration serves the purpose of voicing the collective and of establishing a collective agency. In order to be able to distinguish between these cases, one needs precisely the more rigorous definition Marcus strives to avoid. As I have argued in this section, such a definition will single out the plural narrator as a separate type of narrator and thus make it possible to recognize the effects and to address features of we-narrative under its own conventions, independently of first-person narratives, but also to distinguish the noteworthy uses of we-narration in other cases. To further illustrate the consequences of my limiting definition, I will now turn to a more extended discussion of Ferris's novel. I will look into several strategies of construction of a plural character narrator and, on this basis, into what the plural narrator means for narrative analysis and interpretation.
Joshua Ferris's Then We Came to the End as an Example of We-Narrative
As I mentioned earlier, Then We Came to the End is a novel about a work community of a large advertising agency. The novel's we-narrator is a full-blown collective agent, in Margolin's sense, and can be situated somewhere between a community, "a group with a shared sense of identity, " and "the group as a corporate entity, a totally impersonal network of positions and roles that creates the impression of an independent entity with a will of its own" ("Telling in the Plural" 591). Techniques that strongly contribute to the construction of such a narrator in the novel are: (1) we-voice as idiom (i.e., as characterization, sensu Walsh "Person, Level, Voice"); (2) a consistent collective self-reference without an implied 'I' 8 ; and (3) collective physical action and shared thoughts, feelings, and emotions.
The novel opens with the plural character narrator telling who 'we' are: "We were fractious and overpaid. . . . Ordinarily jobs came in and we completed them in a timely and professional manner. Sometimes fuckups did occur. Printing errors, transposed numbers. Our business was advertising and details were important" (3). Similar self-descriptions abound throughout the novel and can refer to anything: to what can be called factual information ("We had had a toy client, a car client, a long-distance carrier, and a pet store chain, " 70), evaluative comments ("We had the great good fortune and shortcomings of character that marked every generation that had never seen war, " ibid.), and concerns ("We were deeply concerned about who was next, and what criteria for dismissal the partners were operating under, " 91). 'We' not only talk about 'ourselves' but, importantly, perform routine physical actions as a collectivity: it is 'we' who sit at desks, sift through emails, sip coffee, or leave rooms. This strategy keeps the narrator concrete as a character-not letting it slide into an amorphous generalizing 'we. ' Such insistence on specifying the nature of the 'we' is, however, infused with individualizations. Particular people that comprise 'our' community are also introduced from the first pages of the novel: e.g., "He [Frank] knew it because he was one of us, and we knew everything" (4), or "It made us cringe, especially Marcia, especially if Hank was present" (7) . In this manner, the consistent, collective self-reference is often specified with third-person references to individuals, to 'some of us'-or outsiderswhich, nevertheless, contribute to creating a sense of community. Consider, for example, this passage: "we spent most of our time inside long silent pauses as we bent over our individual desks, working on some task at hand, lost to it-until Benny, bored, came and stood in the doorway. 'What are you up to?' he' d ask. It could have been any of us. 'Working' was the usual reply" (7; emphasis added). 'Our' day and working routines are so unified or trivial that, even though each of 'us' works on individual tasks, it is not important to specify them. The last sentence of the quotation is especially significant because it involves an engagement of the plural character into a dialogue. In order to get around the need of referencing the character-narrator by name, Ferris opts for an impersonal speech tag "was the usual reply"-from any one of 'us'-which emphasizes yet again the absence of an individual 'I' in this office 'we. ' Thus, an important implication of using a plural narrator is the need for a new approach to speech representation. While narration by a communal character is usually unproblematic-a narrative can create a plausible voice for any character, anthropomorphic and individual or not-engagement in the direct speech with individual characters may strain such plausibility and lead to comical effects of, e.g., a choir of office employees speaking with their boss. And, even though this novel is humorous otherwise, Ferris manages to avoid such vocal implausibility by combining narration, free indirect, and direct speech in the dialogue lines of the we-narrator. Let me quote one such dialogue here at length. A fresh rumour in the office is that one of 'us, ' Benny, has an obsession with a strange totem pole. Since he avoids talking to 'us' about it, one day 'we' try to extract some information from his father who happens to walk by the office:
We're not sure what you may or may not know, we said one day when, happily, we stumbled upon Benny's father, waiting for Benny in the main lobby. Some of us recognized him from the picture in Benny's office. . . . But about a month ago, we said to him, his son was given an odd little bequest by a guy who used to work here. Did he know what we were referring to? "The totem pole?" his father asked. Yes, the totem pole. And did he also know that during the past six weeks, Benny had gone to the guy's house a dozen or more times? . . . We asked him if he was aware of that.
"I knew he went down there. " His father nodded. "I didn't know it was that many times, but I knew he went down there, sure. I've been down there with him. "
He had been down there with him? "Sure. " And what did the two of them do while down there? "We looked at it, " said Benny's father. That was it? All the two of them did was look at it? "Well, then we put on our headdresses and prayed for corn. Is that what you're looking for?" (170) This passage works as a plausible description of an interaction between 'the office' and Benny's father and, I argue, does not evoke qualifiers such as unnatural voice or an "impossible representation" (210)-unlike, for example, Richardson's discussion of we-narration in "Representing Social Minds" suggests. The latter qualification is a paradox and the former implies a qualitative comparison with I-narration and with the "demands of ordinary usage" of the pronoun (207) compared to which the narratorial 'we' would be 'unnatural. ' Because of a combination of narration with free indirect speech for 'our' dialogue lines, the reader, arguably, does not single out this passage as implausible, impossible or 'unnatural' within the storyworld, having grown accustomed to a chatty, gossipy we-narrator who routinely re-tells conversations which 'some of us' had with other characters. 9 Rather, in its unified vocal plurality this passage records the situation of conversation where a group is cornering someone else who can satisfy their nosiness and hunger for information-a situation where, again, the individual speaker for the group would be unimportant as the group unifies in their curiosity and interrogative stance. The technique combining free indirect and direct speech in a dialogue can, furthermore, be taken as a contribution to we-narrative's own set of mimetic conventions, creating the rules of 'collective realism' mentioned above.
Thus, treating the we-narrator of Then We Came to the End as a collectivity matters structurally because of obvious differences in representational techniques of an agency which is collective from that which is individual (i.e., an I-narrator). A collective agency of the we-narrator in Ferris's novel allows, furthermore, for a creation of 'us vs. outsiders' dynamic and offers an extensive knowledge (even omniscience) about each of 'our' private lives. Often such a shared pool of knowledge is created with the help of gossip as in the example above. Interpretatively, the plurality of the narrator matters in that it contributes to the novel's implications of the group as offering security in the face of precarity and fear, often through anonymity, and of the we-voice as an expression of corporate culture, with 'groupthink' formed during thousands of meetings and watercooler stories.
Being part of the group also means collective responsibility which, in cases when the boss wants to know who exactly is responsible for a cruel prank, can be a good thing:
Lynn Mason wanted to know who was responsible. "Give me a name, Benny, " she said. Benny deflected her request. "It wasn't any one person, I don't think, " he said. "It was more of like a zeitgeist. " " 'Zeitgeist'? What's that, what's a 'zeitgeist, ' Benny?" "You know, " he said. "No, I don't know, " countered Lynn. "All due respect, Benny, I think art directors should avoid using fancy words. If you have a name for me of who's responsible for this, I' d like you to say it. " "I don't have a name for you, " he said. "It was just something going around, a lot of people were talking about it. It was a joke, I thought. " "Sounds like you must have a whole bunch of names for me, then, " replied Lynn. "Yeah, but not one specific name, " said Benny. "Honest-I don't know whose idea it was, and I don't know who did it. But I can tell you that it wasn't Tom. " (132) This passage wittily meta-comments on the novel's technique: the we-narrator proper does not readily invite questions of who is 'actually' acting or 'actually' talking on 'our' behalf. A conversation between Lynn, 'our' boss, a cancer patient and thus an outsider in many respects, and Benny, who is one of 'us, ' reads at once as a metaleptic threat to the we-voice and its defense. It reads as if Lynn takes the we-voice literally and demands what Richardson calls the "ordinary usage of the pronoun" where 'we' would stand in for 'I + others. ' Benny, on the contrary, functions as a mouthpiece for a collective we-character where no individual agent matters. For the novel in general, the we-voice proper allows for a holistic account of office work life not anchored in any particular individual but endowed with a validity which is at once personal and collective. Rather than focusing on subjectivities of individual protagonists, Then We Came to the End brings to the fore the collectivity of its narrator and universality of its concerns.
At the same time, the we-narration in Ferris's novel also creates a particular negative sentiment and can be read as a strategy of denial. Hardships always happen to someone else, not 'us. ' The group implies a sense of normality and collectivity that becomes an illusory shield against certain life troubles: madness, joblessness, sickness or death always happen to those characters in the novel which are outsiders to 'our' group. These hardships are usually treated as deeply individual and thus cannot threaten a group because, of course, if they befall one of 'us, ' she or he is immediately discursively excluded from the we-reference. Thus, it is all the more painful to realize, in the moment of weakness, that 'we' are not that different from 'them, ' that 'we' often are 'them' in 'our' various social roles:
Our souls were as screwy and in need of guidance as all the rest. What were we but sheep like them? We were them. We were all we-whereas for so long we had believed ourselves to be just a little bit above the others. One unfinished ad could throw us into these paroxysms of self-doubt and intimations of averageness, and for these reasons-not the promise of gossip or the need for caffeine-we found ourselves driven out of our individual offices that morning and into the company of others. (235; emphasis in original) ' We' are in a need for constant reinforcement of 'our' belonging to "the company of others, " which is both a reassurance in the times of crisis and another means of keeping this group alive as a group. It is worth noting that semantically we-reference is extremely unstable, including and excluding its referents freely and without changes in its morphological form. Thus, on the one hand, the more individuals become separated from the office 'we' and the more they are fired, the less clear it might become whether there remains any group to be called 'we' . On the other hand, boundaries of the group membership, by definition, are always fuzzy and, once constructed, they need to be constantly reinforced. One of the defining features of collectivities as a social phenomenon is that they "persist despite the coming and going of their individual members due to birth, volunteering, capture, resignation, expulsion, or death. This is because . . . there are aspects of any collectivity that exist and persist independently of its membership of the moment" (Jenkins 24, cf. 14, 20) . It is this latter sense, I suggest, with which Then We Came to the End works: the novel constructs a symbolic entity which can be called 'we, ' the office, and which persists throughout subsequent comings and goings. But whatever the purpose of plural we-narrators, it can only be inferred in an interpretation that does not reduce such narrators to singular ones. We-narrators create a specific situation of telling and a specific type of character who is a collective agent. This, in turn, influences various other elements of narrative-constructions of knowledge and focalization, representations of speech and action-that will need further investigation as elements of a first-person plural narrative. What remains for this article, however, is to give a formal summary of features of a we-narrative as an independent narrative form and its extended definition.
Towards a Definition of a We-Narrative Proper
Formally, a we-narrative must be defined by the first-person plural pronoun which refers to a group of characters which is also the narrator (cf. Fludernik "The Category of 'Person' " 114). In other words, we-narrative employs the first-person plural pronoun as the reference to and self-designation of its narrator-character. However, formal criteria alone are not sufficient to distinguish we-narrative from other uses of we-narration. Thematically, a we-narrative must be defined by the narrator functioning as a collective narrative agent-a collective subjectivity, which the narrative performatively creates and maintains throughout its course. Because of its grammatical features, namely the semantic instability and the peculiar nature of its reference, the personal pronoun 'we' also embraces the positions of the focalizer-experiencer, that of the narrated entity, and can include the narratee.
We-narrative requires a structural dominance of the we-narrator, and thus instances of we-narration often found in multiperson narratives will not be classified as we-narratives. Since we-narrative, as a narrative form, can be defined on the basis of a narrative situation whose own defining criterion is that of person, it is only in this sense that it can be regarded as an extension of the first-person singular narrative situation (Ich-Erzählung in Stanzel's terms). The use of 'we' only on the narratorial level does not constitute a we-narrative proper (as this will merely be an instance of pluralis auctoris or a feature of an authorial narrative situation) and neither do we-references by an I-narrator limited to the story level (as they will not change the first-person form of such narratives). At the same time, intermediary cases should be acknowledged. One has to take into consideration the peculiar nature of 'we' in the role of the storytelling pronoun: it may express a collectivity or it may mask a singular narration that will only be revealed at a later point in a narrative. The line between the two is often only perceivable in the context of the larger portions of narrative or of a text as a whole.
Nevertheless, representation of a full-blown we-narrator (that is, one behind which there lies no inferable I-speaker) relies on a certain holistic supraindividual level. The we-narrator refers to a collection of individuals who, as a group, necessarily lose their individual properties. This group acts as a distinct, collective character. Writing in 1934 on the idea of collective novel, Granville Hicks already observed that: "The collective novel not only has no individual hero; some group of persons occupies in it a position analogous to that of the hero in conventional fiction. Without lapsing into the mysticism of those pseudo-psychologists who talk about the group-mind, we can see that, under certain circumstances, a group may come into existence that is independent of and more important than any of the individuals who compose it" (27) . 10 This observation has been strongly supported by recent studies in group sociality and group knowledge, especially by the work of Raimo Tuomela. In his book The Philosophy of Sociality, Tuomela convincingly shows the irreducible difference between three modes of human social interaction: individuals acting as private persons in the "I-mode" (3), individuals acting in the progroup fashion but still pursuing their own goals ("the progroup I-mode, " ibid.), and individuals acting in the "we-mode" (or "the group mode, " ibid.). Without going into the details of Tuomela's theory here, it should be said that the we-mode involves its own patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting that "are (conceptually and factually) based on thinking and acting as a group member and therefore thinking and acting for a group reason (in a full-blown sense requiring the satisfaction of the Collectivity Condition)" (13). Translated into narratological terminology, Tuomela's we-mode theory of social interaction supports my argument for treating the we-narrator under the "collectivity condition" (13-16), i.e., as a narratorial agent in its own right, capable of acting as a unit-an independent character-and exhibiting its own beliefs and other mental states.
Furthermore, group knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes are more than mere aggregates of individual pieces thereof and thus are not reducible to any individual member of the we-group (e.g., Mathiesen; Hakli et al.) . In this sense, as Margolin also observes, 'we' is different from 'I + you + him/her': "There can obviously be no groups without individuals who embody them, but groups can and do have attributes that belong to the holistic level only" ("Telling in the Plural" 598). So, it is possible to talk of we-narrators who 'think, ' 'feel, ' and 'see' without deeming such collective characters transgressive, impossible, or 'unnatural' (cf. Palmer "The Mind beyond the Skin"). But for a narrative to create such a full-blown we-narrator, rather than a pro-group I-narrator, it has to create the conditions for its coming into being, both in structural and in thematic terms.
Finally, in the course of a we-narrative proper, 'we' is never identified as 'I' and does not call for such an identification. The plural and truly collective storytelling voice is made structurally possible by we-narration and is the most salient feature of a we-narrative proper. Communicative situations with the 'we' can be divided into four types: (1) a group is speaking as a whole; (2) several (at least two) group members are speaking in unison, referring to the group they represent (e.g., a chorus in ancient Greek drama); (3) group members speak individually, taking turns, but use 'we' to refer to the group and themselves as its members; and (4) a single group member speaks about and, if empowered to do so, for the group she represents. 11 It is the first scenario that creates a communicative situation of a we-narrative. The narrative 'we' thus transcends the individual discourse originators and functions as a collective speaker, a collective storyteller, and, ultimately, a collective subject.
Endnotes
1. I am grateful to Daniel Hartley, Gero Guttzeit, and Richard Walsh for their feedback at the initial stages of this article.
2. I say 'in some cases' because I believe that the conception of 'social mind, ' albeit useful in drawing attention to collective mental states in fiction, needs further elaboration and a more precise sphere of use. Thus, for example, in the recent special issue of Narrative on social minds, Alders literally equates "social minds" with "the agents of shared experience" and "groups of various sizes, shapes, and modalities" (113). I think such use of the word 'mind': (a) makes it lose the specificity of cognitive inquiry into issues of cognition and intersubjectivity related to groups; and (b) obstructs an inquiry into other aspects of representations of groups and their ideological implications. Another example is Richardson's use of the phrase in the same Narrative issue: for that article Richardson reworks some of his earlier publications on focalization in we-narratives, now using "social mind" instead of or synonymically with focalization.
3. In this respect I intend this paper as a further development of one key proposal regarding narration in the plural from "Emergent Narrative Situations" (Bekhta) : the distinction between first-person narrative situations (with or without passages of we-narration) and first-person plural narrative situations (we-narratives).
4. I discuss this short story as an example of indicative 'we' use-that is, a use which, according to my definition, does not constitute a we-narrative-in "Emerging Narrative Situations. "
